Seal · for reviewers
Three things a signed record can be asked to prove. One of them is not solved.
Everything below runs on a real production receipt, signed by Aqta's gateway on 13 August 2026. Break each one yourself. The point is not that the first probe passes. It is where the third one stops.
01 Authenticity
SolvedDo exactly these fields verify against the published key, and has anything changed since they were signed? Edit any value below. The signature covers the canonical bytes of all eleven fields, so changing one character changes what was signed.
Solved means this and nothing wider: nobody has altered the record since it was signed. Probes 02 and 03 are what that leaves untouched.
Click any value to edit it.
bytes matchUnchanged since signing. This is the receipt the gateway produced.
What this page does and does not do. It shows you which bytes the signature covers, so an edit is visibly outside them. It does not run Ed25519: to check the signature itself, run npx aqta-verify-receipt against the published key, offline, with no account.
02 Correctness
PartialThe record says a particular model ran under particular rules. Does the signature establish that this is what actually happened inside the machine?
| Field | What it establishes |
|---|---|
| model | The gateway stated claude-sonnet-4-6 |
| policy_applied | The gateway stated budget_guard, loop_guard |
| request_hash | A SHA-256 the gateway computed over the request |
| signature | The key holder asserted all of the above |
Press the button to see what the signature still says.
A signature is an assertion by a key holder, not evidence of execution fidelity. It proves who said it and that nobody edited it afterwards. Binding the record to the computation that actually ran needs hardware attestation; ours is laboratory work at TRL 3, outside production, as our own threat model states.
03 Completeness
OpenHere are the decisions one lender sealed on 13 August. Every one verifies. One consequential decision that day was never written down at all. Find it.
| Time | Attestation | Outcome | Signature |
|---|---|---|---|
| 01:27:11 | 520a3601 | ALLOWED | valid |
| 04:02:56 | c81be40f | ALLOWED | valid |
| 09:41:08 | 7d2aa914 | BLOCKED | valid |
| 11:19:33 | e0c47b52 | ALLOWED | valid |
| 15:52:47 | 1f9d3ac8 | SUPPRESSED | valid |
| 18:07:20 | 9ab6f701 | ALLOWED | valid |
Every row above checks out. That is the problem.
Nothing we know of closes this. An append-only log over issuance narrows the window in which a record can be withheld, and narrowing is not closing. We publish this as open, not solved and not claimed.
Receipt 520a3601-0d94-4b32-9619-a512ca853a94, signed 13 Aug 2026 under key 9Y3Eiq…. Verify it yourself: the record formats, both verifiers and every published conformance vector are public, and a reviewer countersigns one at review.aqta.ai. Signing is production. The review flow is a prototype and says so. Back to security.
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